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Abstract Perspectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by your perspective,
that is, your epistemic position. Objectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined
by the facts irrespective of your perspective. This paper explores an influential argument
for perspectivism which appeals to the thought that the normative is action guiding. The
crucial premise of the argument is that you ought to φ only if you are able to φ for the
reasons which determine that you ought to φ. We show that this premise can be under-
stood in different ways. On one reading, it provides no support for perspectivism. On
another reading, the premise lacks support. So, the argument fails. An important upshot
of the paper is that the objectivist can embrace the thought about guidance.
Keywords Normative reasons . Guidance . Objectivism . Perspectivism . Ought .Motivating
reasons
1 Introduction
Perspectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by your perspective on the
facts. Objectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by the facts irrespective
of your perspective. What constitutes your perspective? Different answers to this ques-
tion result in different version of perspectivism. The basic idea, common to them all, is
that your perspective is determined by your epistemic position – the evidence you have,
or your justified beliefs, or what you know, or what you in a position to know, and so on.
To see the difference, suppose that a drug will cure a doctor’s patient but all her evidence,
everything she is in a position to know, etc., suggests that it will kill the patient. According to
objectivism, the doctor ought to give the drug. In contrast, according to perspectivism, the






1 Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK
doctor ought not to do so. Of course, the case is underdescribed but it is uncontroversial that
what you ought to do relative to the facts might diverge from what you ought to do relative to
your epistemic position.1
Some think that the dispute between objectivists and perspectivists is merely verbal. The
facts determine what you ought to do in the ‘objective’ sense, while your epistemic position
determines what you ought to do in the ‘perspectival’ sense. But, even if there are different
senses of ‘ought’, a dispute remains. In deliberation, we ask ourselves a single question, ‘What
ought I to do?’ It is a substantive question whether the ‘ought’ in play here depends on the
facts or one’s perspective. This is the question objectivists and perspectivists disagree over (cf.
Broome 2013, ch. 2; Kiesewetter 2011; Graham 2010; Lord 2015; Zimmerman 2008: ch. 1).2
In this paper, we examine one of the main arguments in support of perspectivism, which we
call the argument from guidance.3 As the name suggests, that argument draws on the
compelling, if suggestive, idea that the normative must be able to guide us.
We show that this argument fails. We distinguish two interpretations of the idea that the
normative is guiding and argue that, on the interpretation the perspectivist requires, the idea
should be rejected, given the principle that ought implies can. Not everyone accepts this
principle, of course, but it is not open to the proponent of the argument from guidance to reject
it, since one of the premises of her argument entails it. The positive lesson that emerges is that,
when understood in the right way, the objectivist can embrace the compelling idea that the
normative must be able to guide us.
To be clear, we do not here seek to defend objectivism, or to reject perspectivism. Our aim,
instead, is to challenge one prominent and influential argument for perspectivism.
2 Preliminaries
There are different versions of perspectivism. For simplicity, we focus on a particular kind.
Although our central points apply to some other versions of the view, we will not try to show
this here.4
The version of perspectivism we focus on accepts two familiar ideas. First, what you ought
to do is determined by normative reasons. Normative reasons are considerations which count
in favour of, or against, an action (cf. Scanlon 1998, 17). What you ought to do is determined
by how the normative reasons for and against acting weigh up – roughly, you ought to do what
the balance of such reasons supports. For instance, if there is a reason for you to take an
umbrella, and no stronger reason not to do so, you ought to take an umbrella.
Normative reasons contrast with motivating reasons – the reasons for which you act. In some
cases, the reasons for which you act are, or correspond to, reasons for acting. That is to say, in
1 In this paper, we focus on the dispute between perspectivists and objectivists concerning how you ought to act.
There is a parallel dispute concerning what you ought to believe. (For discussion, see Feldman 1988; Gibbons
2013; Littlejohn 2012; Way and Whiting 2016a)
2 Not everyone accepts this line of thought (cf. Sepielli Forthcoming) but it is not our aim here to defend it. Our
concern is with a dispute among those who do accept it.
3 Another influential argument for perspectivism appeals to situations of structural uncertainty (see Dancy 2000,
57–58; Jackson 1991; Kiesewetter 2011; Lord 2015; Regan 1980; Ross 2012; Setiya 2014; Zimmerman 2008,
ch. 1). Since this argument has already had much attention (see, for example, Graham 2010; Kiesewetter
Forthcoming; Sepielli Forthcoming), we will not discuss it here.
4 We will not, for example, discuss Zimmerman’s (2008) perspectivism.
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some cases, your motivating reasons are, or correspond to, normative reasons.5 For instance,
that it is raining might speak in favour of taking an umbrella and be the reason for which you do
so. We return below to the connection between normative and motivating reasons.
The second idea that the version of perspective we focus on involves is that normative
reasons are facts. For example, the fact that it is raining might be a reason to take an umbrella.
Both these ideas are plausible and widely accepted by objectivists and perspectivists alike.6
Nonetheless, there is a prima facie tension between them and the perspectivist’s claim that what
you ought to do depends on your perspective. Suppose that some fact which does not fall within
your perspective counts for some action. For example, it will rain, although you are in no position
to know this, you have no evidence that it will rain, and so on. If this reason is weighty enough, it
seems that it could make it the case that you ought to take an umbrella. But, in that case, what you
ought to do is not a function of your perspective: that it will rain lies outside your perspective.
The perspectivist can avoid this tension in two ways. First, she might say that which facts
are reasons for you is itself epistemically constrained. For example, the perspectivist might say
that the fact that p is a reason for you only if you know that p, or are in a position to know that p,
or have evidence that p, etc. (Dancy 2000, 56–59; Kiesewetter Forthcoming; Markovits 2010,
219; Raz 2011, 111). Second, the perspectivist might say that what you ought to do does not
depend on all of the reasons there are but only on the reasons which fall within your perspective.
On this view, the fact that p can be a reason for you even if you do not know (etc.) that p. But only
facts which you know (etc.) bear on what you ought to do (Lord 2013; Setiya 2014).7
The difference between these views turns on whether there are reasons which fall outside
your perspective. If we say that a reason which falls within your perspective is a perspective-
relative reason, the views differ on whether all reasons are perspective-relative. This difference
will not be important in what follows. We focus on the thesis which these views share, namely,
that what you ought to do is determined by your perspective-relative reasons.
This is an attractive and increasingly popular version of perspectivism, precisely because it
respects the plausible ideas that normative reasons are facts and that ‘oughts’ are determined
by reasons so understood. Thus although our focus is in this way limited, it is broad enough to
be of considerable interest.
For concreteness, we will need to make an assumption about what it takes for a reason to
fall within your perspective. Specifically, we will assume that your perspective is constituted
by what you know:
P=K That p falls within your perspective if and only if you know that p.
It follows that a reason bears on what you ought to do only if you know the fact which is that
reason. We make this assumption solely for presentational purposes. As we will explain, the
arguments to follow could proceed given alternative views aboutwhat constitutes your perspective.8
5 For discussion, see Alvarez 2010; Dancy 2000.
6 Objectivists who accept them include Parfit (2011) and Schroeder (2007). Perspectivists who accept them
include Broome (2013), Dancy (2000, 56–59), Kiesewetter (forthcoming), Kolodny (2007), Lord (2013),
Markovits (2010), Raz (2011, 211), Scanlon 1998 (see 2008, ch.2 for his perspectivism), and Setiya (2014).
7 Several philosophers seem to accept both perspectivism and the familiar ideas but do not explain how these are
to be reconciled (see, for example, Broome 2013; Kolodny 2007; Scanlon 2008, ch. 2). Although he does not
accept that reasons are facts, Gibbons (2013) defends a view which is otherwise similar to the first approach.
8 As noted, perspectivists differ on what constitutes one’s perspective. Kiesewetter (forthcoming) endorses the
left-right direction of P=K but leaves open whether the right-left direction holds. Lord (2013, ch. 3) and Dancy
(2000, 56–59) defend versions of the view that your perspective is what you are in a position to know.
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As mentioned above, we will appeal to the principle that ought implies can:
OIC If you ought to φ, you can φ.
Some objectivists reject OIC, as do some perspectivists. Fortunately, we do not need to
defend the principle here. As mentioned above, the proponent of the argument from guidance
is committed to it.
In passing, note that whether one should accept OIC turns in part on how ‘can’ is to be
understood. We return to this below.
3 The Argument from Guidance
Behind the argument from guidance is the intuitive thought that normativity is action guiding.
In Raz’s words, ‘normative reasons can guide agents’ (2011, 26). As Korsgaard puts it, ‘A
practical reason must function […] as a guide’ (2008, 31). In the familiar terminology,
normative reasons can be motivating reasons.9
You might think that this points toward perspectivism. Reasons tell us what to do, as it were,
and they can only do that if we are in a position to listen to and heed their advice. As Gibbons
says, since ‘genuinely normative reasons and requirements must be capable of guiding us in
some important sense […] these reasons and requirements must be accessible to us in some
important sense’ (2013, 132). Reasons must be capable of guiding us in the sense that we are
able to act for or on the basis of those reasons, at least, if they are to determine what we ought to
do. And reasons must be accessible in the sense that they fall within our perspective.
These remarks are, of course, suggestive at best. Here is an attempt to make more explicit
the line of thought they point to10:
(1) If you ought to φ, you have the ability to φ for the right reasons, that is, the reasons that
make it the case that you ought to φ.
(2) If you have the ability to φ for the right reasons, those reasons fall within your
perspective.
(3) So, if you ought to φ, those reasons fall within your perspective.
If successful, this argument supports perspectivism. Given P=K, its conclusion is
that, if you ought to φ, you know the facts which make it the case that you ought to
φ.
What is to be said for or against the premises of the argument? That depends on how talk of
abilities is to be understood. We will show that the argument from guidance requires a
9 This thesis is often called ‘internalism’. So understood, internalism should be distinguished from the view –
also sometimes called ‘internalism’, and which below we call the ‘Humean theory of reasons’ – that all reasons
depend on our desires. Given this diversity of usage, we prefer to avoid the term ‘internalism’. We discuss the
connection between the argument from guidance and an argument for the Humean theory below.
10 Such lines of thought date back at least to Prichard. According to Prichard, if duty ‘depends on certain facts of
the situation’, there will be cases in which, ‘though we may have duties, we can never, strictly-speaking, do a
duty […] because it is a duty’. This shows, he continues, that one’s duty depends ‘on our being in a certain
attitude of mind towards the situation in respect of knowledge, thought, or opinion’ (2002, 89). For recent
versions of the argument, see Dancy 2000, 59; Gibbons 2013, ch. 6; Lord 2015; Raz 2011, 109–111. The version
we discuss here is closest to Lord’s.
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particular interpretation of such talk and that, under that interpretation, premise (1) is
unsupported.
4 General and Specific Abilities
Suppose that Serena is at the baseline equipped with a ball and racket. In a clear sense,
Serena is able to serve – she is in a position to do so. Suppose instead that Serena is on a plane
travelling to a match and her equipment is in cargo. Serena is not in a position to serve there
and then. Nonetheless, in a clear sense, Serena is still able to serve. Her situation is not like that
of a person who has never had the chance to learn tennis or who lacks the strength to raise a
racket. For another example, suppose that Gordon knows how to make a cake but lacks the
ingredients. In one sense, he is unable to make a cake – he cannot do so here and now. But, in
another sense, he is able to make a cake – he has the competence to do so.
Different theorists mark this distinction in different ways.11 Following Mele (2002),
we will use ‘general ability’ for the sense in which Serena is able to serve even while on
the plane, and in which Gordon is able to make a cake even when lacking the ingredi-
ents. A general ability to φ is an ability to φ in a wide range of circumstances, if not the
present circumstances (here and now). We will use ‘specific ability’ for the sense in
which Serena is unable to serve while on the plane, and in which Gordon is unable to
make a cake without the ingredients. A specific ability to φ is an ability to φ in the
present circumstances (here and now). As the examples illustrate, someone with a
general ability to φ might lack the specific opportunity because, for instance, they lack
the opportunity to φ – as when Gordon lacks the ingredients to make a cake – or because
of some kind of interference – as when Serena is too tired to lift her racket.
In view of this, (1) is ambiguous between:
(1g) If you ought to φ, you have the general ability to φ for the right reasons.
(1s) If you ought to φ, you have the specific ability to φ for the right reasons.
Likewise, (2) is ambiguous between:
(2g) If you have the general ability to φ for the right reasons, those reasons fall within
your perspective
(2s) If you have the specific ability to φ for the right reasons, those reasons fall within
your perspective.
(2g) is clearly false. To be able in the general sense to act for a reason of a certain sort, that
reason does not need to be within your reach, any more than a tennis racket needs to be within
Serena’s reach if she is to be able, in that sense, to serve.12
11 See, for example, Clarke 2009; Honoré 1964; Kenny 1975; Maier 2015; Mele 2002; Whittle 2010.
12 This point does not beg the question against the perspectivist who holds that all reasons are perspective-relative
(in the sense explained above). Suppose that it is raining but you do not know this. If all reasons are perspective-
relative, the fact that it is raining is not a reason for you to take an umbrella. Nonetheless, you still have the
general ability to do things such as taking an umbrella on the basis of that kind of consideration. Were you to
learn that it is raining, hence, were there to be a reason for you to take an umbrella, you could do so for that
reason.
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(2s) is plausible and we accept it for present purposes. For example, if the fact that it is
raining makes it the case that you ought to take an umbrella, you are not able in the specific
sense to take an umbrella when leaving the house on the basis of that fact, that is, for that
reason, unless you know that it is raining.
Since (2) must be read as (2s), to avoid equivocation (1) must be read as (1s). Importantly,
(1s), unlike (1g), implies OIC. OIC, at least as ordinarily understood, says that ‘ought’ implies
specific ability (cf. Vranas 2007).13 And, if you have the specific ability to φ for the right
reasons, then you have the specific ability to φ.
The claim that reasons must be able to move us is a familiar and plausible one.14 It
features prominently in debates over the Humean theory of reasons and the possibility of
pragmatic reasons for belief. Humeans claim that since reasons must be able to motivate
us, and since only considerations appropriately related to our desires can motivate us,
only considerations appropriately related to our desires can be reasons (Williams 1981:
ch.8). Evidentialists claim that since reasons must be able to motivate us, and since only
evidence can motivate belief, only evidence can be a reason to believe (Kelly 2002; Shah
2006).15
However, the version of the thought that reasons must be able to move us which
features in these debates is weaker than (1s). Humeans claim that even known facts
which do not connect to our desires cannot motivate action; evidentialists claim that even
known pragmatic considerations cannot motivate belief. In both cases, the claim is that
we lack the general ability to be moved by a certain sort of consideration. This is a claim
objectivists can accept.
So far then, it seems open to objectivists to say that (1g) is all that we need to capture what
is plausible about (1). And since (2g) is false, the argument from guidance fails under this
interpretation.
5 The Argument from Creditworthiness
Lord (2015) argues in support of premise (1). Although he does not note the distinction above,
we will consider whether the arguments he provides support (1s).16
Lord appeals to a notion of creditworthiness. You are creditworthy or deserve credit
for something when it reflects well on you and insofar as you are responsible for it. In
this sense, you can be creditworthy for your achievements, ideas, decisions, traits, and so
on. Among the things you can be creditworthy for, and the thing Lord focuses on, is
doing what you ought to do. Famously, you can do what you ought to do without being
creditworthy for doing so. When Kant’s shopkeeper refrains from overcharging an
inexperienced customer, he does what he ought to do but, according to Kant, he is not
creditworthy for doing the right thing if he does it for reasons of profit rather than
13 If OIC only concerned general ability, then it could not explain why, for instance, it is not the case that Serena
ought to serve when she is on the plane and her racket is in cargo.
14 For relevant discussion, see Way and Whiting 2016b.
15 To say that a belief is motivated by a reason is here to say that it is held for that reason.
16 Lord offers two arguments in support of (1). Since the arguments are closely related, and the points we make
apply to both, we focus our attention on the argument from creditworthiness, confining comments on the further
argument to n18.
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fairness (1998, 4:397). Or to adapt our earlier example, if a doctor ought to give her
patient a drug because it will save the patient’s life, but does so on the grounds that it
will free up some space in her pockets, she does what she ought to do but is not
creditworthy for having done so.
What is required to be creditworthy for doing what you ought to do? According to a
popular and plausible view, you deserve credit for doing what you ought to do just in case you
do it for the right reasons, that is, for the reasons which make it the case that you ought to φ
(see Arpaly 2002; Markovits 2010). For instance, if the doctor gave the patient the drug for the
reason that it will save the patient’s life, the doctor would be creditworthy for doing what she
ought to do – giving the patient the drug.
With this background, we can state Lord’s argument for (1s). If (1s) is false, there will
be cases in which a subject ought to φ even though she is not able (in the specific sense)
to get credit for φing. Suppose that the doctor ought to give her patient a drug but does
not know the facts which make it the case that she ought to do this. In that case, she is
not able to give the drug for the right reasons. So, she is not able to get credit for giving
the drug.
Lord takes this to be implausible. It cannot be the case that you ought to perform some act if
you are not able to do so in a way that is creditworthy. So, (1s) must be true.
6 Ought Implies Can
The central assumption in this argument is:
Credit You ought to φ only if you have the specific ability to φ in a way that is
creditworthy.
One might doubt this assumption. That we cannot always get credit for doing the right thing
is, one might think, an unfortunate fact of life, not a strike against objectivism. Rather than
pursue this directly, we will argue that, given OIC, there will be cases in which a subject ought
to perform some act but can only do so in a way which is not creditworthy. The perspectivist
who accepts OIC should thus reject Credit. In that case, the perspectivist is left without this
argument for (1s), hence, for (3).
Consider:
DOCTOR A doctor is deciding whether to give drug A or drug B to a patient who has a
painful and fatal disease. She knows that Awill completely cure the patient, relieving all
the patient’s suffering and saving her life, and that B will not save the life of her patient
but will relieve the patient’s suffering. The doctor also knows that, if she tries to give one
drug, she will be unable to give the other. However, though she is no position to know
this, and despite evidence to the contrary, the doctor is unable (in the specific sense) to
give A. As it happens, the doctor gives B to the patient for the reason that it will relieve
her suffering.17
17 It is no part of the case as described that the doctor believes that she ought to give A. Perhaps she has no belief
about what she ought to do. Perhaps she believes that she ought to give B. Such details are irrelevant to the points
that follow.
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Given OIC, both objectivists and perspectivists should agree that it is not the case that the
doctor ought to give A, since she is unable to give A. What then ought she to do? If we also
assume that there are no facts which count against giving B, it is plausible that the fact that
giving B will relieve the patient’s suffering is a decisive reason to give B, and thus that she
ought to give B. But the doctor is not creditworthy for giving B. So, given OIC, DOCTOR is a
counterexample to Credit: the doctor ought to give drug B but lacks the specific ability to do so
in a creditworthy fashion.18
We take it to be intuitive that the doctor is not creditworthy for giving B, indeed, that she is
not able (in the specific sense) to give B in a creditworthy fashion. To bolster this point, note
that, in giving B when it seems from her perspective that she can give A, the doctor seems to
be manifesting callous indifference to the life of her patient. To be creditworthy in giving B the
doctor would have to have some reason to think that she cannot give A (or lack reason to think
that she can give A). But she does not.
Here is another way of arguing against Credit by appeal to DOCTOR. Given OIC, it is
not the case that the doctor ought to give A. Given Credit, it is also not the case that she
ought to give B. So, OIC and Credit together imply that there is nothing the doctor ought
to do in this case. But this claim is extremely counterintuitive. After all, the doctor has a
third option: she can do nothing. If it is not the case that the doctor ought to give B, she
must be permitted to give B and also permitted to do nothing. But it is counterintuitive
that the doctor is permitted to do nothing, when she knows that she could instead relieve
the patient’s suffering. And since giving B is the only permitted option, given OIC, then
she ought to give B, contra Credit.
We conclude that, given OIC, we should reject Credit. In that case, Lord’s
argument from creditworthiness for (1s) fails, and so the argument from guidance in
support of perspectivism fails. Perhaps there are other considerations which favour
(1s) than those relating to creditworthiness. But the onus is on the perspectivist to
provide them.19
As mentioned above, rejecting OIC instead of Credit is not an option available to the
proponent of the argument from guidance, since (1s) entails OIC.
Also, as noted above, the objection does not turn on P=K. Since the doctor knows the facts
which constitute the reasons in this case, she will meet any weaker constraint on what it takes
for a fact – hence, a reason – to fall within a person’s perspective (for example, rational true
belief). If someone proposes a stronger constraint on what it takes for a fact – hence, a reason –
to fall within a person’s perspective, we can revise the case so that the doctor meets it. For
18 It is not intended as a counterexample to the claim that you deserve credit for doing what you ought to do just
in case you do it for the right reasons. A proponent of that view might deny that the doctor is acting for the right
reason as such, since she is insensitive to its being the right reason. Alternatively, she might claim that the doctor
is partially creditworthy. We discuss partial credit below.
19 Lord’s other argument for (1), understood here as (1s), rests on:
No Accident You ought to φ only if you have the specific ability to φ and thereby non-accidentally do what you
ought to do.
Lord argues that non-accidentally doing what you ought to do requires that the reasons which determine what
you ought to do fall within your perspective. If they do not, you can only do what you ought to do for the wrong
reasons or for no reasons at all. In that sense, it would be a happy accident if you did the right thing. So, if (1s) is
false, there will be cases in which you are not able to non-accidentally do what you ought to do.
However, it should be clear that in this sense the doctor in DOCTOR is only able to do the right thing
accidentally. So, given OIC, this case shows that No Accident is false too. There are, of course, replies to these
claims. Those replies will mirror those we consider below in relation to the argument from creditworthiness. So,
for the sake of brevity, we will not rehearse them here.
368 J. Way, D. Whiting
example, if someone proposed that a fact falls within a person’s perspective only if that person
knows that she knows that fact, we can revise the case so that the doctor knows that she knows
that drug A will completely cure the patient, and so on.
7 Replies
There are two ways for a proponent of the argument from guidance to respond to the above
case – by insisting that the doctor is creditworthy or by denying that she ought to give B. We
consider these in turn.
7.1 Partial Credit
One might concede that the doctor is not wholly creditworthy – deserving of full credit – but
insist that she is nonetheless creditworthy to some degree – deserving of partial credit. After
all, the doctor is manifesting some concern for her patient’s suffering. So, the above case does
not undermine the following:
Credit* You ought to φ only if you have the specific ability to φ in a way that is partially
creditworthy.
However, Credit* does not support (1s). To see this, suppose that a person ought to φ due
to a host of reasons, most of which lie outside of her perspective, one of which falls within it.
She φs for the reason of which she is aware. One might think that the person deserves some
credit forφing – since sheφs for one of the reasons which make it the case that she ought toφ
– but not full credit – since she φs in ignorance of the bulk of the considerations which
determine that she ought to φ. This case satisfies Credit*. So, Credit* only supports:
(1s*) If you ought to φ, you have the specific ability to φ for some of the right reasons.
(1s*), in turn, only supports a weak version of perspectivism, according to which some but
not all of the relevant reasons must fall within your perspective.
This is not an attractive version of perspectivism and we doubt that it will appeal to
perspectivists, since, as just noted, it allows considerations outside of a person’s perspective
to play, not just a role, but a dominant role in determining what she ought to do. As a result, it
will not deliver perspectivist-friendly verdicts in many cases.20
So, the appeal to the idea of partial credit does not help the proponent of the argument from
guidance to reach her desired conclusion, namely, (3).
7.2 Trying
An alternative response to DOCTOR, and in support of Credit, is to deny that the doctor ought
to give B. Proponents of this response must say what it is that the doctor ought to do instead of
giving B. This alternative must be something she is able (in the specific sense) to do, and in a
20 For example, cases of structural uncertainty (cf. fn. 3).
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creditworthy fashion. We take it that the most plausible version of this response says that the
doctor ought to try to give A.21
One problem for this response is that we can revise DOCTOR so that the doctor is not even
able (in the specific sense) to try to give A. In this version of the case, there are no acts,
physical or mental, that she can perform that would constitute trying to give A.22 Moreover, we
can add that, by the time the doctor realises that she cannot try to give A, the opportunity to
give B has passed. Given OIC, if the doctor cannot try to give A, it is not the case that she
ought to do so. Since doing so will help the patient, she ought instead to give B. But, if the
doctor gives B, she is not creditworthy.
One might object that, for any act, a person can (in the specific sense) try to perform it. But
that is simply false. To try to perform an act is itself to perform some (possibly mental) act and,
like any other act, a person might lack the specific ability to perform it. Compare: a loving
parent cannot try to kill her children. Even if she has the general ability to perform acts of that
type, the parent’s love prevents her from exercising it in her circumstances; that is, her love
interferes with her general ability to make attempts on her children’s lives. Compare also: a
mathematician has the general ability to solve a difficult math problem but cannot in her
present circumstances so much as try to do so, since she is deeply depressed, say, or
preoccupied with lecturing. In a similar fashion, even if the doctor is in general able to try
to give A, something might interfere with that ability in the case at hand.
It might be replied that, even if the doctor cannot try to give A, there will still be other
options available to her. For instance, perhaps she can try to try to give A, or perhaps she can
try to find out whether she can give A. It might then be suggested that the doctor ought to take
one of these options, and that she has the specific ability to do so in a creditworthy fashion.
However, it is not clear why there must always be some such option available. Just as it can
be impossible for a person to try to do something, it can be impossible for that person to try to
try to do it, to try to find out whether she should do it, or to do anything else which appears to
be a means to doing it. To continue with one of the examples above, a parent’s love might
make it impossible for her, not just to try to kill her children, but to try to try to do so, or to try
to find out how to do so, and so on. We can stipulate that the doctor lacks any such options
with respect to giving A.
It is also worth noting that both of these suggestions face independent problems. A problem
with the first is that it is not clear that it is even possible to try to try to do something (cf. Clarke
2009, 347).23 To the extent that we can make sense of it, trying to try to do something seems to
be a way of trying to do that thing. A problem with the second is that it is not clear which facts
in the doctor’s perspective decisively support trying to find out whether she can give A. The
most plausible candidate for a fact which favours trying to find out whether she can give A is
21 The proponent of the argument from guidance might attempt to bolster their denial that the doctor ought to
give B by appealing to a principle of luminosity: that you ought toφ only if you have the specific ability to know
that you ought to φ. Since it seems clear that the doctor does not have the specific ability to know that she ought
to give B – after all, she reasonably thinks she can give A – luminosity implies that it is not the case that she
ought to give B. However, luminosity is highly questionable. Following Williamson (2000), many deny that any
non-trivial condition is luminous. Quite independently of that, not being able to tell what you ought to do is a
familiar, if frustrating, experience. In any case, proponents of luminosity will still need to say what it is that the
doctor ought to do in the above case. It is this issue we focus on here.
22 Or, for that matter, trying to try to give A, or trying to try to try to give A, and so on.
23 As Clarke observes, it is possible to try to bring it about that you try to do something – for example, by
providing yourself with an incentive for trying to do it. But trying to bring it about that you try should be
distinguished from trying to try.
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the fact that she does not know whether she can give A. But this is not a fact that falls within
the doctor’s perspective.
7.3 Still Trying
Although we think that the revised case succeeds in undermining Credit, we need not rely on
it. There is an additional problem facing the perspectivist who claims that, in the original case,
the doctor ought to try to give A.
If the doctor ought to try to give A, then the balance of reasons supports doing so. The
perspectivist taking this line must thus identify the reasons that support trying to give A. This is
not straightforward. In many cases, reasons to try to act derive from reasons to act. For
instance, a teacher’s reasons to try to finish marking tonight derive from the reasons to finish
marking tonight. Since there are no reasons to give A, there are no reasons of this sort for the
doctor to try to give A.24
The most promising suggestion here is that the reason to try to give A is provided by the
expected value of doing so.25 This idea is naturally combined with a general picture on which
the considerations within a person’s perspective – that is, what she knows – provide reasons for
attempts by providing evidence that those attempts will realise or promote something of value.
The expected value of an attempt is a function of the relevant value and the likelihood that the
attempt will succeed in promoting or realising it.26
We do not object to this picture. But it does not help the perspectivist’s defence of Credit.
To see this, consider the following version of the case.27 The value of giving A, that is, of
saving the patient, is 1, while the value of giving B, that is, of relieving her suffering, is 0.8.
Relative to what the doctor knows about her situation, the probability that she can give B is 1.
So, the expected value of trying to give B is 0.8. Relative to what the doctor knows, the
probability that she can give A is 0.7. So, the expected value of trying to give A is 0.7. Given
the above picture, the doctor ought to try to give B. However, the doctor (falsely but
reasonably) believes that she can give A. If she tries to give B, she is not creditworthy for
doing so. On the contrary, it seems callous not to attempt to give A. So, even if we grant that
the expected value of trying provides reasons for doing so, there remain counterexamples to
Credit.
One might object that it is not callous for the doctor to try to give B in this version of the
case. After all, trying to give B has a higher expected value than any of her alternatives. How
could it be callous to be guided by expected value?
24 This assumes the principle reason implies can:
RIC If you have a reason to φ, you can φ.
Here ‘can’ is understood to ascribe specific ability. We take RIC to be independently plausible. It is also very
natural for proponents of OIC, which includes proponents of the argument from guidance, to accept the principle.
For one thing, it offers a simple explanation for why OIC holds. For another, denying RIC has awkward
consequences – for instance, that you can have most reason to do something that it is not the case that you ought
to do. For defence of RIC, see Streumer 2007; Vranas 2007
25 There can also be other kinds of reasons to try to do things you cannot do. For instance, reasons to try can be
provided by the benefits of trying, or by its expressive or symbolic value. However, we can stipulate that there are
no benefits in DOCTOR. There may be some expressive value – in trying to give A, the doctor shows care for the
patient. But it seems doubtful that this provides strong enough reason to outweigh the reasons to give B, thereby
saving the patient’s life.
26 For a view of this sort, see Broome 2013, ch. 3. For a related view, see Zimmerman 2008, ch. 1.
27 We make some simplifying assumptions about the units and functions involved but for illustrative purposes
only.
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The crucial point is this. The expected value of giving B, on the above conception of
expected value, is relative only to the known facts. However, when thinking about whether or
not a course of action is callous, we do not only take into account the known facts, but also
what the agent reasonably believes, truly or falsely. Once we take this into account, it is clear
that the doctor would be callous to try to give B in this revised case. Since the doctor
reasonably believes that she can give A, and knows that A will save the patient’s life, she
shows indifference to the patient’s life unless she tries to give A.
It might now be replied that it cannot be reasonable for the doctor to believe that she can
give Awhen this is only 0.7 probable on her knowledge. But similar considerations apply here
too. What is reasonable for a person to believe does not depend only on what she knows but
also on her other reasonable beliefs, true or false, perceptual experiences, veridical or non-
veridical, and so on. So, what makes it reasonable for the doctor to believe that she can give A
need not be something she knows.28,29
One might now wonder whether the perspectivist’s problems stem from the assumption that
one’s perspective is constituted by what one knows, that is, by P=K. It might seem that the
perspectivist can avoid these problems if she takes the more liberal view that a person’s
perspective is constituted by her reasonable beliefs.
However, since we can have reasonable false beliefs, this more liberal view is incompatible
with the popular and plausible assumption that reasons are facts. It thus lacks one of the central
attractions of the version of perspectivism we have been focusing on. Furthermore, it is not
clear that even this move will help the proponent of the argument from guidance. For it is
arguably callous for the doctor to try to give B if she so much as believes that she can give A –
reasonably or not. We can thus set up a version of the case in which the expected value of
trying to give B relative to the doctor’s reasonable beliefs is greater than the expected value of
trying to give A, and yet in which the doctor lacks the specific ability to try to give B in a
creditworthy fashion because she unreasonably believes that she can give A.
We conclude that the proponent of the argument from guidance cannot plausibly maintain
that the doctor ought to try to give A, at least in the revised version of the case discussed in this
section. This attempt to defend Credit from our counter-example thus fails.
8 Conclusion
The crucial premise in the argument from guidance is:
(1) If you ought to φ, you have the ability to φ for the right reasons, that is, the reasons that
make it the case that you ought to φ.
We have argued that (1) can be understood in different ways. On one interpretation, the one
the perspectivist needs, the premise lacks support. We argued against the case for it by appeal
to the principle that ought implies can (§§6–7). On reflection, it may be unsurprising that a
major line of thought leading to perspectivism is in tension with that principle. After all,
28 Note that we could also adjust the numbers to avoid this concern.
29 This implies that what it is reasonable to believe is not determined solely by one’s reasons. But given the
assumption that one’s reasons are what one knows, and the very plausible claim that one’s reasonable but false
beliefs bear on what it is reasonable to believe, it is clear that perspectivists of the sort we are here concerned with
must reject this assumption.
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perspectivism says that what you ought to do is determined by your perspective. Whether or
not you can do something need not fall within your perspective.30 Unfortunately for the
proponent of the argument from guidance, rejecting the principle is not an option.
On the other interpretation of the relevant premise, as discussed above, the objectivist can
accept it (§4). A person ought to perform some act only if she is able in the general sense to do
so for reasons of the appropriate sort. In this sense, the objectivist can agree that the normative
is action guiding.
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